 |
Possible
effects of the Garrison Diversion include harm wildlife that
rely on the Hudson Bay Basin water system for their survival. |
The
Northwest Area Water Supply (NAWS) project seeks to create a municipal,
rural and industrial bulk-water distribution system for 10 North
Dakota communities using an inter-basin transfer of Missouri River
Basin water to the Hudson Bay Basin . The project is part of the
Garrison Diversion Project. The “preferred alternative”
calls for Missouri River water to be pre-treated at the intake and
piped to Minot, N.D., for final treatment before delivery to communities
and rural water systems. The project cost is in excess of $98 million
($USD).
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
A draft Environmental Assessment (EA) for the project prepared for
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) was
issued in June 1997. The final EA was issued in April 2001. The
EA assessed the potential impacts of 4 alternatives in relation
to a series of “environmental commitments” that “are
made to ensure that impacts of construction of NAWS facilities are
kept to a minimum”, in particular by attempting to reduce
the threat of inter-basin transfer of biota. Based upon the EA analyses,
the Bureau came to a “Finding of No Significant Impact”
(FONSI) on May 18, 2001, and concluded that “[r]easonably
foreseeable activities, as described in the EA, will not have adverse
effects on the human or natural environment” and, therefore,
that no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was needed to satisfy
the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The FONSI declared
that “[a]ll potential environmental issues have been identified
and analyzed” and that “[a]ny negative impacts will
be mitigated by the environmental commitments” identified
in the EA. If the Bureau had concluded in any other way than a FONSI,
then it would have been obliged by NEPA to carry forward a detailed
EIS, likely requiring an additional year of study, and significant
additional costs, which North Dakota politicians were strongly opposed
to.
HISTORICAL
CANADIAN CONCERN
The NAWS project is the first proposed inter-basin transfer of water
from the MRB to the HBB, with inherent risks of transferring alien
biota from the USA to Canada. As such, it has potential precedent-setting
importance for Canada-USA relations and the perceived integrity
of the Boundary Waters Treaty signed in 1909. The project has been
a longstanding concern of Manitoba, Canada, the States of Missouri
and Minnesota and the Great Lakes Commission. The International
Joint Commission (IJC) concluded in 1977 that construction of the
Garrison Diversion should not take place until “the Governments
of Canada and the United States agree that methods have been proven
that will eliminate the risk of biota transfer, or if the question
of biota transfer is agreed to be no longer a matter of concern”.
 |
| A
map showing the expected water supply project, and the distribution
to the various communities. |
CANADIAN
INTERVENTIONS
Manitoba and Canada have repeatedly sought assurance that the potential
for irreversible harm to Canadian waters and ecosystems be fully understood
and eliminated or reduced to an absolute minimum. Manitoba Environment
and Environment Canada therefore submitted comments emphasizing the
risks of inter-basin transfer of non-native biota. On July 9, 1999,
they met with the U.S Department of State, where Canada and the USA
failed to agree that biota transfer is “no longer a matter of
concern”. On June 4, 2001, Manitoba and Canada requested a copy
of a key newly discovered document used by the Bureau in developing
its FONSI. Manitoba and Canada requested access to the modelling data
and information supporting both the CRA and the FONSI, and for access
to the CRA’s authors and USEPA scientists. No additional useful
information was provided from the Bureau and U.S. State Department
and study team access to USEPA technical experts and CRA authors was
denied. Due to the errors and omissions in the Bureau’s documents,
the questionable analysis of biota-transfer risks, and constrained
access to relevant data and report authors, Manitoba and Canada decided
to appeal the Bureau’s analyses and decision-making process.
APPEAL
OF BUREAU’S “FONSI”
Environment Canada and Manitoba Conservation filed an appeal of
the Bureau’s FONSI on July 13, 2001. TetrES Consultants’
technical report, which examined technical deficiencies in the Bureau’s
analysis of the project’s potential impacts and in its choice
of mitigation measures, was a key element of the submission. Relying
on TetrES’ report, Manitoba and Canada asserted that
- There
was substantial residual uncertainty whether the project could
have significant impacts on Canadian health and property
- The
NAWS project should be subject to a comprehensive EIS
- The
NAWS project EA and FONSI should be withdrawn by the Bureau, and
a credible and comprehensive EIS on the project, with special
attention to transboundary impacts should be prepared and circulated
for public comment
- The
Bureau should undertake no further action on the NAWS project
until such a comprehensive NEPA review was complete and acceptable
to Canada.
Manitoba
and Canada were advised that similar Bureau projects had been subjected
to a full EIS according to prior Bureau practice and precedent.
Lastly, Manitoba and Canada were aware of the definitive 1979 Executive
Order and the 1997 CEQ policy statement under NEPA to consider “transboundary
impacts”.
TETRES
CONSULTANTS’ INVOLVEMENT
TetrES was retained to analyze the consistency of the NAWS project,
especially the IJC conclusions regarding the inter-basin transfer
of Missouri River water to the Canada, and U.S. obligations under
the Treaty to avoid polluting waters crossing the boundary able
to cause injury to health or property in Canada. TetrES was to review
the EA and the FONSI with attention to these matters, to evaluate
the methodological and logical sufficiency of the Bureau’s
environmental analyses, and to develop a credible and robust technical
challenge of the EA and FONSI.
ERRORS
AND OMISSIONS IN BUREAU’S ASSESSMENT PROCESS
TetrES’ technical review strengthened the prior submissions
by Environment Canada and the Province of Manitoba on the NAWS project.
TetrES found abundant evidence that the Bureau had not properly
analyzed biota transfer risks to Manitoba waters. TetrES identified
numerous unsubstantiated analyses, inappropriate assumptions, errors
and omissions.
The EA and FONSI failed to achieve consistency with assessment-process
requirements and precedents and Presidential Directives. They provided
incomplete and incorrect assessment of potential project impacts
and consequences. For instance, there was a complete failure in
the Bureau’s analyses to identify and evaluate adverse impacts
on Canadian resources and downstream communities, especially on
the First Nations communities dependant on the Souris and Assiniboine
Rivers.
 |
| The
pathways for biota transfer from non-Hudson Bay basin sources
to the Hudson Bay Basin was improperly analyzed. |
INTERBASIN
BIOTA-TRANSFER RISK
The EA and CRA did not adequately describe the consequences of inter-basin
transfer of biota. The project impacts on numerous species listed
as “rare/endangered/ vulnerable” for North Dakota such
as the three-ridge valvata were not evaluated, and impacts on other
listed species were insufficiently considered.
The risk assessment
in the CRA was deficient in numerous other ways. “Hydraulic
Connection risks” should not have been included in the CRA
because with recommended IJC mitigation, hydraulic connectivity
should not be occurring and future hydraulic connectivity between
the basins should be zero. As well, the CRA erred in contemplating
fish stocking as a biota-transfer vector because, with proper management,
the risk from fish stocking should be zero. Further, the CRA failed
to acknowledge that all water systems have unaccounted-for water.
Non-catastrophic pipe failure is the most significant single risk
in a water-supply project, and leaks are the least likely to attract
remedial action, therefore posing a more significant long-term risk.
Unaccountably, risks of biotic transfer through such leaks were
not analyzed.
DESIGN
OF TREATMENT SYSTEM
The FONSI ignored the design-option risk analyses that showed that
the lowest-risk project alternative was to provide membrane filtration
and full treatment at the source because this is a reasonable and
practicable alternative, costing only $12 million of the ~$100 million
project cost, it should have been included. Its rejection by the
Bureau was not credibly explained.
 |
| The
expected risks of biota transfer is increased by many factors
including system including non-project pathways(yellow) and
routine operation (blue). |
The
selected design was found to be incapable of guaranteeing that some
combination of accident, equipment failure or human error will not
result in a release of MRB water into the HBB. The design was based
on meeting only minimal, and outdated, regulatory requirements.
Best professional practice would suggest that a 1989 design standard
is inappropriate for effective reduction of biota in a current design.
EPA rules have evolved greatly since the 1989 Surface Water Treatment
Rule; the current rule requires filtration (unless the source is
secure) and that chlorine-resistant biota be accounted for in the
design, which the Bureau failed to do. As well, the design failed
to address whether algae
in the Lake Sakakawea or Lake Audobon source waters could be a treatment
challenge or interference; because algae will interfere with effectiveness
of chemical disinfection, the implications for effective treatment/disinfection
should have been addressed in the design.
The
design did not adequately address system-upset potential, pipe-breakage
rates, and reasonably predictable failures in backup systems and/or
mitigation measures. While described as “treated water”,
implying public acceptability, the routine operation of the proposed
treatment plant was acknowledged to transfer 3.6 E+09 gallons of
unfiltered water or organisms into the HBB. Even with softening,
filtration and wastewater treatment, routine discharge to HBB waterways
would still be in the order of 3.6 E+05 organisms/year. The Bureau’s
decision to ignore the utility of
membrane filtration in the final design precluded an opportunity
to limit the theoretical transfer to only 3.6 organisms/year.
IMPACT
MITIGATION
The mitigation measures noted in the NAWS documentation, given the
current design, cannot prevent significant interbasin biotic transfer
and are inadequate or prone to failure. They are clearly insufficient
to support a FONSI. Further, the mitigation measures noted in the
Bureau’s documents are routinely described in a conditional,
rather then declarative, form, and the underlying conditions influencing
mitigation activities not defined. The EA acknowledges mitigation
measures may not be implemented or effective (EA p. 83; “if
those measure are followed, then … no impact would be expected”).
As well, the responsibilities for effecting, monitoring & enforcing
mitigation measure were not defined, nor were the mandates, specific
responsibilities, and independence of the “impact-mitigation-assessment”
team asserted to be responsible for ensuring mitigation. |
